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The human ability to discover and use correlations be-
tween environmental events to facilitate performance has
been documented innumerable times since the earliest
days of experimental psychology. Early research on
schedules of reinforcement illustrated the influence of
environmental contingencies on human behavior. More
recent work suggests that environmental contingencies
can affect behavior in either of two ways: (1) by subjects
intentionally using known contingencies to develop ex-
plicit strategies or (2) by an unintentional process sen-
sitive to frequency and/or correlation guiding subjects’
responses, often without their awareness. Mounting evi-
dence suggests that these intentional and unintentional
processes are distinct. Responses generated by explicit
strategies are often qualitatively different in style from
responses generated by other presumably implicit pro-
cesses (Green & Flowers, 1991). Implicit and explicit
sensitivity to correlated structures may also be differ-
ently affected by experimental task manipulations such
as imposition of an additional processing load (Curran &
Keele, 1993; Reber, 1993). It has also been suggested
that overall performance of a given task may not be “en-
tirely implicit” or “entirely explicit,” but rather, it may re-
sult from a combination of these unintentional and inten-
tional processes (Reber, 1993).
The notion of a continuum of implicit and explicit pro-
cesses has been most strongly articulated by Reber
(1993). He has asserted that learning about event struc-
ture may start as an implicit process but become increas-
ingly explicit with repeated exposure to the stochastic re-
lationship between the events. However, Reber has also
noted that even when verbal expression of a contingency
is given by subjects performing a task, the reported infor-
mation does not necessarily match either observed per-
formance or the actual stochastic relationships inherent
in the task. This may indicate the control of implicit pro-
cesses even after initiation of explicit learning processes.
Attempts at dissociating implicit and explicit learning
processes have typically involved task manipulations
such as secondary task imposition to presumably restrict
the use of capacity-limited explicit representation (e.g.,
Curran & Keele, 1993). We have chosen an alternative
approach to examining the different properties of im-
plicit and explicit representation of probability relation-
ships. This approach involves comparing the performance
of subjects who are completely informed about a proba-
bility rule through verbal instruction with subjects who
are completely uninformed about the existence of sto-
chastic relationships among the stimuli. Even though im-
plicit and explicit representation of stochastic relation-
ships may coexist during performance of a particular task,
there may be situations under which implicit processes
are more beneficial to performance (e.g., high-processing
load) and vice versa (e.g., when stochastically related
events are separated in time or by intervening events).
Prior research from our laboratory using a computer game
task in which screen events were correlated (Green &
Flowers, 1991) showed that both informed and unin-
formed subjects made use of the event probability rela-
tionship, but that response style (patterns of joystick ma-
nipulation) differed qualitatively for the two groups, and
overall performance of the informed group was actually
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Intentional versus unintentional use
of contingencies between perceptual events
KIETH A. CARLSON and JOHN H. FLOWERS
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In three experiments we studied human ability to use statistical contingencies between visual stim-
uli (flankers and targets) to improve performance in a letter–digit classification task. We compared
the performance of explicitly informed subjects with that of subjects who were told nothing of the
contingencies. Simultaneous presentation of flankers and targets (Experiment 1) produced evidence
of unintentional contingency use by both informed and uninformed subjects. When stimuli on trial
n predicted target stimuli on trial n1 (Experiment 2) there was no evidence of unintentional pro-
cesses, but informed subjects showed strong evidence of using intentional prediction strategies.
When flanker onset preceded target stimuli presentation (Experiment 3), evidence of contingency
use by both informed and uninformed subjects was found, but the data illustrated qualitative differ-
ences in response style (e.g., speed–accuracy tradeoffs) between the two groups. Intentional and un-
intentional uses of contingencies between perceptual events are qualitatively distinct with respect
to the time frame in which they can be applied and the performance patterns they produce. Finally,
we argue that the unintentional processes studied here are implicit in nature.
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worse than that of the uninformed group. The perfor-
mance decrement among the informed subjects may
have reflected the increased processing load imposed by
the need to keep the rule in working memory. Manipula-
tion of instruction level in conjunction with task vari-
ables that affect processing load and temporal properties
of the task would thus seem to hold promise for investi-
gating the relative effectiveness of explicit versus im-
plicit processing under differing task conditions.
EXPERIMENT 1
Miller (1987) demonstrated that flankers correlated
with simultaneously presented targets can affect reac-
tion times (RTs). In the present research, we used a sim-
ilar flanker task that required subjects to classify target
stimuli as letters or digits as quickly and accurately as
possible. Targets were flanked on both sides by one of
three symbols, each having a certain probability rela-
tionship with the target’s category. Half the subjects were
explicitly informed about the exact contingencies be-
tween the flankers and the target. The remaining subjects
were told that the flanking forms were distractors and
that they should try to ignore them.
Method
Subjects
Eighty undergraduate introductory psychology students ful-
filled a course requirement by participating in a single session
lasting approximately 1 h.
Stimuli and Task
A VGA monitor controlled by a 386DX Gateway microcom-
puter and MEL software were used to present stimuli. Subjects saw
letter or digit targets that were flanked on either side by symbols
(*, @, or #). Subjects pressed one key for letter targets and another
for digit targets. The targets were A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9. RT and accuracy were recorded.
Subjects saw 15 sequences of 48 trials for a total of 720 trials,
with each flanking symbol occurring 16 times per list. Subjects
started each list “as soon as they felt ready.” After the 5th and 10th
sequences, subjects were encouraged to take “longer breaks” if
they desired. Immediately after each key press, a fixation point
() was presented for 750 msec followed by the next stimulus.
The 15 sequences mentioned above were constructed so that
one flanker (either * or @) was more often paired with letter tar-
gets and the other was more often paired with digit targets. The
stimuli that were consistent with this contingency were consistent
(C) trials. Stimuli that violated this contingency were violated (V)
trials. The third flanker (#), which was equally associated with
both letters and digits, defined neutral (N) trials. The number of C
and V trials were either 24 and 8, respectively, or 30 and 2, re-
spectively. This resulted in a probability bias in which a particular
flanker’s appearance “predicted” the target’s identity 75% or 93%
of the time. Subjects experienced either 75% “valid” or 93%
“valid” trial sequences.
Half the subjects were informed about the flanker–target con-
tingencies (informed groups) and the other half were uninformed
about them (uninformed groups). Subjects in the informed condi-
tions were shown the actual contingencies between specif ic
flankers and target categories; these subjects were also given the
instruction, “You may find this information helpful.” The subjects
in the uninformed condition were told to “ignore the distractors”
while responding as “quickly and accurately as possible” to the tar-
get. The result was a 2  2 design with subjects experiencing the
.75 or .93 bias level in combination with being completely in-
formed or uninformed about the contingencies. The four condi-
tions were labeled I75, U75, I93, and U93.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions
and run individually. The appropriate instructions were read aloud
as subjects read the same instructions silently.
After completing the task, subjects were given one of two ques-
tionnaires, depending on whether they were informed or unin-
formed. The uninformed subjects were given a question sheet with
the same questions that the experimenter had asked them to answer
orally. The questionnaires included the following open-ended
questions: “Did you notice any relationship between letters and
flankers?” “Did you notice any relationship between digits and
flankers?” Then the following more leading questions were asked:
“Did you notice whether certain flankers were more likely to ap-
pear with letters than with digits?” “Did you notice whether certain
flankers were more likely to appear with digits than with letters?”1
Informed subjects were asked the following three questions: “Did
you use the provided information about the relationships between
the flankers and the letters?” “Did you use the provided informa-
tion about the flankers and the digits?” “Do you think knowing this
information helped you perform better than if you had not been
given this information?”
Results and Discussion
All RTs greater than 1,000 and less than 150 msec were
discarded. Trials resulting in errors were not used in the
RT analysis. This resulted in less than 3% excluded data
for each trial type.
Subjects experienced 15 sequences of 48 trials each
for a total of 720 trials. The first 5, second 5, and final 5
sequences were each combined to form three analysis
blocks. Mean RTs were calculated for each trial type, re-
sulting in nine means per subject, one for each trial type
in each block. These means constituted the data used in
the subsequent RT analyses.
RT Analysis
Figure 1 displays the mean RTs  trial type for each
of the four conditions.2 As can be seen in Figure 1, in all
conditions subjects responded fastest to C trials and
slowest to V trials.
Figure 1. Mean reaction times (RTs) for each trial type in Experi-
ment 1. Error bars depict 1 SE.
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The data from each condition were analyzed individ-
ually. In all four conditions, 3 (trial type)  3 (block)
within-subject analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated
significant trial type and block effects.
As shown in Figure 1, all four analyses revealed signif-
icantly faster responses to C trials than to V trials: U93
[F(2,38)  6.30, MSe  600.27, p  .004]; I93 [F(2,38) 
3.61, MSe  749.31, p  .037]; U75 [F(2,38)  7.84,
MSe  387.79, p  .001]; and I75 [F(2,38)  14.32,
MSe  396.75, p < .001]. In all conditions, the majority
of subjects were faster on C trials than on V trials.
Specifically, 14 of 20 subjects showed this pattern in
U93, I93, and U75. Seventeen of 20 subjects showed this
pattern in I75. The mean RT differences between C and
V trials for these groups were 15.7, 13.4, 12.6, and
19.7 msec, respectively.
Faster responses occurred in later blocks than in ear-
lier blocks.3 This is common in RT tasks and will not be
explored further.
Error Analysis
Figure 2 shows the proportion of errors  trial type
for each condition. The proportion of errors across trial
type was approximately equal for all conditions except
for the U75 condition. Pairwise t tests indicated that the
percentage of errors was not different across C, N, and V
trials for the U93, I93, and I75 conditions, with t values
from .04 to 1.94 ( p > .06).
In the U75 condition, subjects made significantly
more errors on V trials than on C trials [t(19)  2.15,
p  .044], and significantly more errors on V trials than
on N trials [t(19)  2.39, p  .027]. Despite this differ-
ence in errors, it is noteworthy that subjects did not pro-
duce dramatically elevated error rates for the V trials,
because dramatically elevated error rates for the V trials
would indicate an intentional speed–accuracy tradeoff.
Questionnaire Analysis for Uninformed Subjects
To examine the possibility that the contingencies were
discovered and then intentionally used to generate the
trial type effect, subjects were classified into one of two
groups on the basis of the verbal reports prompted by the
open-ended questions.4 Any subjects saying or writing
anything consistent with the existing contingency during
the experimental interview were classified into the ver-
bally consistent group, with the remaining subjects
forming the verbally inconsistent group.5 Figure 3 shows
the mean RT  trial type for each group.
In the U75 condition, 12 subjects were classified into
the verbally consistent group and 8 subjects formed the
verbally inconsistent group. Although Figure 3 suggests
slightly slower responses for the verbally consistent sub-
jects, an RT comparison between these groups showed
no main effect [F(1,18)  .29, MSe  39,657.09, p 
.598]. More importantly, however, there was no trial type
 group interaction [F(2,36)  .12, MSe  406.67, p 
.889]. Mean V–C differences in RT between verbally con-
sistent and verbally inconsistent subjects were of com-
parable magnitude, 14.0 and 10.4 msec, respectively. Thus
the patterns of performance for these groups were not
qualitatively different.
In the U93 condition, 10 of 20 subjects were classified
into the consistent group. A 3 (trial type)  3 (block) 
2 (group) mixed ANOVA revealed no main effect for
group [F(1,18)  .76, MSe  14,484.5, p  .393]. How-
ever, there was a significant interaction between group
and trial type [F(2,32)  3.57, MSe  528.64, p  .038].
As Figure 3 suggests, the verbally consistent group did
not show a significant trial type effect [F(2,18)  .57,
MSe  471.03, p  .575], whereas the verbally incon-
sistent group did show a trial type effect [F(2,18) 
9.22, MSe  586.25, p  .002]. The mean V–C differ-
ence was only 5 msec for the verbally consistent group
and 25 msec for the verbally inconsistent group. These
results suggest that the use of contingencies between si-
multaneously presented stimuli can occur unintention-
ally. A reviewer of a previous version of this manuscript
(Donald Dulany) suggested that one reason why the ver-
bally consistent subjects showed little or no effect of the
contingency is that with greater awareness of relation-
ships between flankers and targets, those subjects were
better able to follow the instructions to “ignore” the
flankers. Whether or not verbally consistent subjects ac-
tually exhibited the degree of strategic control suggested
above cannot be fully answered here, but these findings
do indicate that the presence of active contingency aware-
ness may override unintentional and automatic sensitivity
to these perceptual correlations.
Questionnaire Analysis for Informed Subjects
In the informed conditions, subjects were asked whether
or not they had tried to use the provided information
about the flankers and targets. Subjects were then grouped
on the basis of their answers.
In the I75 condition, only 6 subjects claimed to have
used the information for at least some of the experiment.
Because of the small size of this sample, a between-groups
analysis was not performed. A within-group analysis of
the RTs for the remaining 14 subjects, who stated they
did not try to use the provided contingencies at all, pro-
Figure 2. Percent errors for each trial type in Experiment 1. Error
bars depict 1 SE.
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duced a significant trial type effect [F(2,26)  7.92,
MSe  551.65, p  .002]. The mean RT difference be-
tween V and C trials was 19.79 msec for this subset of
subjects and 19.67 msec for all 20 subjects. Thus, the re-
moval of the 6 subjects claiming rule use had no effect
on the mean V–C difference.
In the I93 condition, 5 subjects claimed to have used
the information for at least some of the experiment. The
remaining 15 subjects, who denied having used the pro-
vided information, did produce a significant trial type
effect [F(2,28)  5.48, MSe  779.89, p  .010]. The
mean RT difference between V and C trials for this sub-
set of subjects was 18.8 msec, whereas it was 13.39 msec
for all 20 subjects. In fact, the 5 supposedly rule-using
subjects produced the following V–C RT differences: 7,
13, 9, 8, and 9 msec.
Questionnaire Responses and Error Patterns
Table 1 displays the error percentages for V, N, and C
trials on the basis of classification of subjects by ques-
tionnaire responses. Although the low overall frequency
of errors and the uneven distribution of subjects accord-
ing to questionnaire responses makes formal parametric
analysis of error patterns tenuous, it is worth noting that
error patterns are consistent with RT patterns. Differences
in error rates between V and C trials were greater for ver-
bally inconsistent uninformed subjects at both bias lev-
els. Furthermore, at both bias levels, informed subjects
who denied using the contingency produced greater
error rate increases between V and C trials than did sub-
jects who reported some contingency use.
In summary, these analyses demonstrate that subjects’
performance was sensitive to flanker–target correlations.
Furthermore, these analyses suggest that use of the statis-
Figure 3. Mean reaction times (RTs) for subjects classifed into subgroups in Experiment 1. Error bars depict 1 SE.
Table 1
Error Rates and Verbal Responses by Condition
Trial Type
Condition C N V
U75
Verbally consistent 3.4 3.5 4.1
Verbally inconsistent 2.2 1.8 3.9
U93
Verbally consistent 4.0 2.4 2.7
Verbally inconsistent 2.7 2.5 4.8
I75
Contingency using 3.6 3.7 3.2
Contingency ignoring 2.6 2.5 3.1
I93
Contingency using 2.1 2.4 2.7
Contingency ignoring 4.1 4.0 7.8
Note—C, consistent; N, neutral; V, violated; U, uninformed; I, in-
formed.
464 CARLSON AND FLOWERS
tical contingencies was largely unintentional. Since the
questions were unexpected, one possible interpretation is
that subjects entertained explicit target–flanker contin-
gencies that had been “forgotten” prior to questioning. If
uninformed subjects intentionally used explicit contin-
gencies to produce the trial type effects, they presumably
would have used them across the majority of the 720 tri-
als they experienced. It seems highly unlikely that subjects
would forget such simple “rules” if they had been actively
attending to them for such an extended period of time.
This “forgotten rules/contingencies” interpretation be-
comes even more unlikely given that explicitly instructed
subjects who denied attempting to use the “rules” exhib-
ited larger RT differences between V and C trials than did
subjects who claimed intentional use of the “rules.”
Global Comparison of Informed and
Uninformed Subjects
A 3 (trial type)  3 (block)  2 (informed vs. unin-
formed) mixed ANOVA revealed no main effect of in-
struction [F(1,78)  2.44, MSe  23,970.39, p  .122].
The fact that there was a significant trial type effect
[F(2,156)  28.54, MSe  531.48, p < .001] while there
was no significant trial type  instruction interaction
[F(2,156)  .18, MSe  531.48, p  .838] clearly dem-
onstrates that informing subjects about the contingencies
had no major impact on the RT differences they produced
relative to those of uninformed subjects. This finding and
the fact that removing the “most aware” subjects resulted
in equal or greater estimates of contingency use leads us
to conclude that an unintentional process was responsible
for the trial type effects. If intentional processes were
necessary for the trial type effects, one would expect lit-
tle or no contingency use from the verbally inconsistent
subjects, and this was clearly not the case. In order to con-
clude that intentional processes were responsible for the
present effects, one would have to assume that (1) unin-
formed subjects acquired knowledge of the contingencies
that was comparable to that held by completely informed
subjects, (2) they actively used this acquired knowledge
to generate the trial type effect across hundreds of trials
even though the majority of informed subjects denied
using the contingencies they were given, and (3) the un-
informed subjects then forgot this vigorously applied
knowledge in a period of less than a minute after the task.
It seems more parsimonious to assume, as have Miller
(1987) and others, that unintentional, even implicit pro-
cesses are involved in using statistical contingencies be-
tween flankers and targets.
EXPERIMENT 2
Several probability learning experiments have shown
that subjects were able to learn contingencies extending
across as many as seven prior trials (Millward & Reber,
1972). In Experiment 2, stimuli identical to those of Ex-
periment 1 were presented, but the contingencies were
between the flankers of trial n and the target of trial n1
rather than between the flankers and targets of the same
trial. In addition to testing whether such contingencies
can be learned either implicitly or explicitly, we were in-
terested in testing whether the time separating the trials
encourages informed subjects to use explicit strategies
for predicting the target category that were not possible
or practical with the simultaneous presentation of Ex-
periment 1 (Taylor, 1977).
Method
Subjects
Forty-eight undergraduate introductory psychology students
fulfilled a course requirement by participating in a single session
lasting 1 h.
Stimuli and Task
The same microcomputer and MEL software as those in Exper-
iment 1 were used to present the same letters, digits, and flankers
as those in Experiment 2. Subjects pressed one of two designated
keys for letter targets and the other key for digit targets. RT and ac-
curacy were recorded across 9 sequences of 101 trials each.
Subjects were instructed to initiate trials “as soon as they felt
ready.” After the third and sixth sequences, subjects were encour-
aged to take longer breaks (approximately 3–4 min). A fixation
point () appearing for 750 msec defined the intertrial inter-
val, which commenced immediately after responses were given.
Probability bias (.90 or .78) and instruction (informed or unin-
formed) defined the four conditions. The flanker in trial n pre-
dicted the target’s category (letter or digit) in trial n1 with either
.90 or .78 reliability. As in Experiment 1, those trials that were con-
sistent with the probability bias were C trials and those that vio-
lated it were V trials. The # flanker was statistically unrelated to
trial n1 targets and thus defined neutral trials. No correlations
existed between simultaneously presented flankers and targets. For
the .78 bias sequences, there were 150 C trials, 102 N trials, and
48 V trials. For the .90 bias sequences there were 180 C trials, 102
N trials, and 18 V trials. As in Experiment 1, the final manipula-
tion was instruction. Subjects in the informed condition were given
examples demonstrating how the flankers predicted the likely tar-
get category on the successive trial. Subjects in the uninformed
condition were told to ignore the flankers, as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Individual subjects were randomly assigned to conditions and
appropriate instructions read to them as they read the identical in-
structions on the computer terminal. After completion of the task,
informed and uninformed subjects were given different question-
naires. These questionnaires were identical to those used in Ex-
periment 1, except for modifications to reflect the n1 relation-
ship between the flankers and targets.
Results and Discussion
All RTs greater than 1,000 msec were discarded. This
resulted in less than 3% excluded data per trial type.
Subjects experienced a total of 909 trials; however,
because of the n1 contingency there were only 900 test
trials. Trials were consolidated to form three analysis
blocks. Mean RTs were calculated by block and trial type,
resulting in nine means per subject, three trial types in
each block. These means constituted the data used in the
following RT analyses.
RT Analysis
Figure 4 displays the mean RTs  trial type for each
condition. The graph suggests no trial type effects in the
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uninformed conditions and strong trial type effects in the
informed conditions. The mean V–C differences were
.59 and .95 msec for the U78 and U90 conditions, re-
spectively, but were 13.9 and 24.0 msec for the I78 and
I90 conditions, respectively.
Statistical analysis confirmed the above interpretation,
revealing no trial type effects in U78 or U90 [F(2,24) 
.16, MSe  286.36, p  .849, and F(2,22) .02, MSe 
411.84, p .978, respectively]. Also supporting the
above interpretation, the analysis revealed a significant
trial type effect in I78 [F(2,20)  4.58, MSe  506.39,
p  .023], with 7 of 11 subjects producing faster RTs on
C trials than on V trials. A significant trial type effect
was also found in I90 [F(2,22)  4.54, MSe  1,357.02,
p  .022], with 7 of 12 subjects showing the C faster
than the V pattern. With the large informed MSes relative
to uninformed MSes (506 vs. 286 for the .78 probabilities
and 1,357 vs. 412 for the .90 probabilities), there is strong
evidence of substantial individual differences among the
subjects in the informed conditions. Individuals using
the explicitly known contingencies in different ways
could explain these differences. We will discuss this in
detail below.
Error Analysis
Figure 5 displays the errors produced in each condi-
tion. As can be seen, the proportion of errors across trial
type was not significantly different in either U78 nor
U90. However, differences did appear in both of the in-
formed conditions. In I78, the proportion of V errors
was greater than the proportion of N errors [t(10)  2.48,
p  .033], but it was not significantly greater than that in
the C trials [t(10)  1.61]. In the I90 condition, the pro-
portion of V errors was greater than the proportion of C
errors [t(11)  2.44, p  .033].
An examination of individual subjects’ error rates re-
vealed considerable individual variation for the V trials
among informed subjects (ranging from 0.0% to 28.6%
for I78 and from 0.0% to 32.1% for I90). As for the RT ef-
fect mentioned above, the overall trend for higher errors
in the V trials would appear to have been the contribution
of a subset of the informed subjects. This pattern is ex-
amined in more detail in the following section.
Individual Differences Among Informed Subjects
Table 2 lists error rates as well as RT differences be-
tween V and C trials for each individual subject in I78,
and Table 3 lists equivalent data for I90. In addition,
these tables indicate which of these subjects answered
“yes” in their response to the questionnaire items, “Did
you try to use the provided information about the rela-
tionship between (flankers and targets)?” For the I78
condition, 6/11 subjects denied using that information
(Subjects 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, and 11). For these subjects the
mean error rate was 4.31% for V trials and 3.87% for C
trials. For the same 6 (information-ignoring) subjects,
the mean V–C RT difference was only 1.6 msec. For the
remaining 5 subjects, who indicated that they at least
initially had attempted to use the provided information,
the mean error rate was 11.96% for V trials and 5.47%
for C trials. RT differences between V and C trials for
these “rule-using” subjects was 28.75 msec.
For the I90 condition, only 2 of the subjects reported
that they had not attempted to use the rule (Subjects 2 and
6). The mean error rate for these subjects was 10.19% for
Figure 4. Mean reaction times (RTs) for each trial type in Experi-
ment 2. Error bars depict 1 SE.
Figure 5. Percent errors for each trial type in Experiment 2. Error
bars depict 1 SE.
Table 2
Error Rates and Reaction Time (RT) Differences
for Individual Subjects (I78)
Trial Type
Subject C N V RT Difference
1* 7.82 12.50 28.57 52.44
2 1.57 .99 5.76 25.39
3 7.38 4.00 6.85 19.68
4* 3.15 1.00 2.17 18.20
5* 8.89 7.21 8.33 4.37
6 4.31 3.31 3.50 15.17
7 1.38 1.00 0.00 12.37
8* 4.56 4.39 9.86 17.92
9* 2.94 4.33 10.87 50.82
10 5.20 5.40 4.90 1.83
11 3.42 2.01 4.90 6.37
Note—C, consistenct; N, neutral; V, violated; I, informed. *These
subjects indicated at least initial use of the provided information. 
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the V trials and 7.86% for the C trials. Both of the sub-
jects had faster times for V than for C trials, with a mean
difference of 11.8 msec. The remaining 10 subjects,
who indicated having attempted to use the rule, pro-
duced a mean error rate of 10.79% for the V trials but
only a 3.88% rate for the C trials. The mean RT V–C dif-
ference was 31.2 msec, despite the fact that 3 of these 10
subjects produced faster RTs to V than to C trials. How-
ever, one of these (Subject 9) stated that he/she eventu-
ally adopted an idiosyncratic (and erroneous) expecta-
tion of a pattern of sequential alternations of response
keys.
This analysis strongly suggests that overt rule follow-
ing among the instructed subjects may have been an op-
tional strategy. But for those subjects who adopted it, the
result was a characteristic pattern of substantial RT dif-
ferences between V and C trials, coupled with a relatively
dramatic increase in errors on V trials. This type of pat-
tern, indicative of a strong response criterion bias in
favor of “expected” trials, has been observed in a variety
of previous experiments in which subjects were given a
predictive rule and sufficient time between the relevant
cue and the target stimulus to engage in a preparation
strategy (Taylor, 1977). It would appear that one effect of
the strength of the correlation between flankers and tar-
gets (78% vs. 90%) may have been to encourage more
subjects to use a prediction strategy in the high-bias con-
dition relative to the low-bias condition.
Summary
Experiment 2 yielded a very different pattern of re-
sults than that of Experiment 1. No evidence of learning
flanker–target correlations was found for the uninformed
subjects. Apparently implicit learning of correlations be-
tween perceptual events on one trial and events on the
next trial does not seem to occur in this type of discrete
reaction time task. However, at least a subset of the in-
formed subjects demonstrated a substantial effect on
both RT and error rates, suggesting that it is possible for
subjects to use an explicit strategy to actively predict and
prepare for stimuli and/or responses on the basis of events
in a prior trial.
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiment 3 we investigated a task that involved
several of the properties of both Experiments 1 and 2. Tar-
get stimuli were delayed relative to the onset of flankers,
thus providing preparation time for potential explicit
strategies that was absent in Experiment 1. Correlations
existed between flankers and targets within the same
trial, so that the predictors and targets were not separated
by an intervening response as they were in Experiment 2.
Such conditions might be more conducive to both inten-
tional and unintentional learning of correlations.
Method
Subjects
Eighty undergraduate introductory psychology students ful-
filled a course requirement by participating in a single session
lasting 1 h.
Stimuli and Task
The stimuli and the instructions given to subjects were identical
to those given in Experiment 1. Subjects were to press the appropri-
ate key on the basis of whether the target figure was a letter or digit.
Procedure
The procedure differed from that used in Experiment 1 in one
important way. Rather than presenting the flankers and target si-
multaneously, the two flankers separated by a space appeared
750 msec prior to the “insertion” of the target between them. As
in Experiment 1, the contingencies between the flankers and tar-
gets were either .75 or .93. Subjects were randomly assigned to the
different bias levels as well as to the informed and uninformed
conditions.
Results and Discussion
All RTs greater than 1,000 msec were discarded. This
resulted in less than 2% excluded data for each trial type.
The analyses were conducted as in the previous ex-
periments.
RT Analysis
Figure 6 shows the mean RTs for each trial type 
condition. All conditions produced significant trial type
effects with mean C trials faster than mean V trials: U75
[F(2,38)  7.05, MSe  280.99, p  .002]; U93 [F(2,38)
 10.78, MSe  965.97, p < .001]; I75 [F(2,38)  3.51,
MSe  459.18, p  .040]; and I93 [F(2,38)  23.72,
MSe  3,417.14, p < .001]. The majority of subjects
were faster on C than on V trials; 15 of 20 in U75, 18 of
20 in U93, 14 of 20 in I75, and 19 of 20 in I93. The mean
V–C differences were 9.76 msec for U75, 25.61 msec for
U93, 10.35 msec for I75, and 73.5 msec for I93.
Error Analysis
Figure 7 indicates the proportion of errors  trial type
in each condition. In U75, there was no difference between
V (4.64%) and C trials (3.56%) [t(19)  2.00, p 
Table 3
Error Rates and Reaction Time (RT) Differences
for Individual Subjects (I90)
Trial Type
Subject C N V RT Difference
1* 1.46 1.46 1.96 23.44
2 4.27 3.28 5.56 3.11
3* 3.17 3.33 32.08 108.19
4* 4.66 5.61 7.41 12.75
5* .93 3.34 12.96 66.34
6 11.44 10.30 14.81 20.50
7* 1.51 2.37 9.43 30.10
8* 4.23 6.99 17.65 38.65
9* 9.68 14.80 14.81 11.92
10* 2.92 2.10 0.00 9.31
11* 7.31 6.53 5.92 17.86
12* 3.04 5.02 5.68 61.02
Note—C, consistent; N, neutral; V, violated. *These subjects indi-
cated at least initial use of the provided information.
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.060]. And in U93, no differences in errors were found
between V (4.80%) and C (3.30%) trials [t(19)  1.30,
p  .208].
In I75, significantly more errors were produced on V
trials (4.27%) than on C trials (2.88%), [t(19)  2.64, p 
.016]. And in I93, significantly more errors were produced
on V trials (8.11%) than on C trials (3.15%) [t(19)  2.73,
p  .013]. Thus, the mean error rates in each group indi-
cate that while significant increases in errors occurred in
both informed conditions, they were absent in the unin-
formed conditions: The only substantial increase was in
the I93 condition.
Questionnaire Analysis for Uninformed Subjects
The uninformed subjects’ awareness of the existing
relationships was similar to that of their peers in Exper-
iment 1. As in Experiment 1, subjects were grouped ac-
cording to their verbal reports (Figure 8).
In U75, 5 subjects’ verbal reports included information
consistent with the contingencies. The mean V–C dif-
ference was 8.60 msec for these verbally consistent sub-
jects. The remaining 15 subjects produced a significant
trial type effect [F(2,28)  5.90, MSe  287.14, p 
.007], with a mean V–C difference of 10.14 msec. As in
Experiment 1, subjects providing no information consis-
tent with the contingencies were apparently using them.
Furthermore, these V–C differences were comparable in
size to those obtained in Experiment 1.
In U93, 11 subjects reported information consistent
with the contingencies. The mean V–C difference was
33.32 msec for these verbally consistent subjects, who had
a significant overall trial type effect [F(2,20)  7.67,
MSe  1,302.19, p  .003]. For the remaining 9 verbally
inconsistent subjects, the overall trial type effect was
marginally significant [F(2,16)  3.60, MSe  495.87,
p  .051], and the V–C difference of 16.19 msec was
comparable to the difference obtained in Experiment 1.
The discrepancy in magnitude of the V–C difference
produced by the consistent subjects (33.32 msec) relative
to that produced by the inconsistent subjects (16.19 msec)
may indicate some intentional use of the time between
flanker and target presentation on the part of the verbally
consistent subjects.
Questionnaire Analysis for Informed Subjects
The subjects were grouped, as in Experiment 1, accord-
ing to their reported use of the given probability informa-
tion. In I75, 5 subjects claimed not to have used the infor-
mation. The mean V–C difference for these subjects was
4.43 msec. The remaining 15 subjects admitted at least
some use of the provided information but denied having
used the information throughout the trials. These subjects
produced a significant trial type effect [F(2,28)  3.83,
MSe  479.31, p  .034]. The mean V–C difference
was 12.33 msec for these subjects. Many subjects noted
that they had tried using the contingencies intentionally
and had then abandoned this strategy because of high
error rates.
In I93, 7 subjects claimed not to have used the informa-
tion. The mean V–C difference was 38.44 msec; however,
with 1 subject removed, the difference became 17.76 msec.
The remaining 13 subjects admitted having used the con-
tingencies provided. These subjects produced an enormous
V–C difference of 92.38 msec [F(2,24)  31.52, MSe 
2,648.96, p < .001].
The salient pattern in these data is the wide range in
the magnitude of the V–C difference across groups as
well as across subjects using generally more uninten-
tional/implicit versus more intentional/explicit process-
ing strategies. It would appear that when there is suffi-
cient time for intentional contingency use, verbal reports
of contingencies (or their use) are associated with large
V–C differences (i.e., generally in excess of 30 msec),
whereas unintentional use by either informed or unin-
formed subjects leads to smaller V–C differences, compa-
rable to those obtained in Experiment 1 (i.e., 10–20 msec).
Questionnaire Responses and Error Patterns
Table 4 displays the error percentages for V, N, and C
trials based on classification of subjects by questionnaire
responses. Like larger V–C RT differences, larger V–C
error rate differences were associated with questionnaire
Figure 6. Mean reaction times (RTs) for each trial type in Experi-
ment 3. Error bars depict 1 SE.
Figure 7. Percent errors for each trial type in Experiment 3. Error
bars depict 1 SE.
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responses suggesting greater contingency awareness
and/or use. This is particularly noticeable in I93, where
subjects claiming to use the contingency produced a 9.4%
error rate in V trials, whereas the contingency-ignoring
subjects’ error rate was 5.8%.
In summary, it should be apparent from these data that
inclusion of a short time delay between flankers and tar-
gets within the same trial permits both implicit and ex-
plicit learning of flanker–target contingencies. Verbal
reports of contingency use were positively associated
with greater V–C differences. In addition, both verbal
reports and performance patterns suggest that some un-
informed subjects may have acquired an explicit verbal
representation of the contingencies (particularly in the
U93 condition).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present experiments we investigated the differ-
ing consequences of explicit instruction describing spe-
cific stochastic relationships between events (informed
conditions) versus instruction to ignore the existence of
such relationships (uninformed conditions). In Experi-
ment 1, uninformed subjects were able to learn and use
stochastic relationships between simultaneously pre-
sented flankers and targets with little or no verbal aware-
ness of those relationships. In addition, subjects did not
seem to gain further benefit from explicit instructions
about flanker–target correlations. The informed sub-
jects’ verbal responses to questionnaires as well as their
RTs and error rates across trial types suggest that these
subjects abandoned the explicit use of the provided cor-
relation information.
When the correlations were between flankers of trial n
and the target of trial n1 (Experiment 2), uninformed
Figure 8. Mean reaction times (RTs) for subjects classified into subgroups in Experiment 3. Error bars depict 1 SE.
Table 4
Error Rates and Verbal Responses by Condition
Trial Type
Condition C N V
U75
Verbally consistent 4.0 4.0 5.1
Verbally inconsistent 2.2 2.2 3.2
U93
Verbally consistent 3.2 2.9 5.3
Verbally inconsistent 3.4 3.6 4.1
I75
Contingency using 3.4 3.7 5.0
Contingency ignoring 1.5 1.8 2.2
I93
Contingency using 3.4 4.1 9.4
Contingency ignoring 2.7 3.5 5.8
Note—C, consistent; N, neutral; V, violated.
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subjects showed no evidence of learning the correla-
tions. However, at least some informed subjects pro-
duced large RT and error rate differences across trial
types. Matching individual subjects’ questionnaire re-
sponses with their RTs and error rates suggested that
those subjects who claimed to use the correlations pro-
duced markedly longer RTs and substantially more er-
rors on V trials relative to C trials. Furthermore, subjects
in the .93 bias conditions appeared more likely to have
chosen such an explicit strategy.
When the correlations were between flankers and tar-
gets of the same trial and the flankers’ presentation pre-
ceded the targets’ by 750 msec, but occurred within the
same trial frame (Experiment 3), the uninformed sub-
jects were again able to learn the stochastic relationships,
as in Experiment 1. The informed subjects chose either
to use an explicit strategy or to abandon the provided in-
formation. As in Experiment 2, this choice appears to
have been influenced by the strength of the correlations,
with the stronger correlations (.93) leading to more ex-
plicit strategy use than the weaker correlations (.75).
Implicit Versus Explicit Use of Event Correlations
The present experiments suggest important qualita-
tive distinctions between the implicit and explicit (possi-
bly rule-governed) use of information about probability
relationships between perceptual events. The effective use
of intentional strategies suggested by direct verbal
instruction seems to depend on a time delay between the
correlated events. However, such intentional strategies
allow subjects to link information from an event on one
trial to a consequential event on a subsequent trial,
whereas implicit linking of these events in the absence of
instructions does not seem to occur. In contrast, implicit
learning and use of correlations between simultaneous
perceptual events seems to occur, even though subjects
appear unable (and certainly unwilling) to use a con-
scious expectancy strategy to link such events.
An important characteristic of the explicit correlation
use (i.e., an intentional prediction strategy) is that the
choice to employ it seems tied to the strength of the cor-
relations. Inspection of questionnaire data from I78 (Ex-
periment 2) and I75 (Experiment 3) strongly suggested
that these subjects did not use the probability informa-
tion to the same extent that it was used by their higher
probability counterparts (I90 and I93) because such a
strategy would risk false-alarm errors on an unaccept-
ably high proportion of trials. Several subjects specifi-
cally stated that use of the rule led to large error rates and
therefore they did not use the rule. For example, 1 sub-
ject wrote that he tried to use the information initially, “I
would have performed better without it, because with
the information I tried to predict my response and then
made errors.” Another wrote, “It helped create mistakes.”
Still another wrote, “I didn’t think it was helpful because
I didn’t use it after I got the wrong answers.” Explicit in-
struction, therefore, may introduce the additional issue of
costs and benefits of response biasing. Because of this,
the precise wording of instructions to subjects about the
potential usefulness of the probability information, as well
as the degree to which speed or accuracy is emphasized
may be quite critical in determining the pattern of results.
Our subjects were simply told, “You may find [these cor-
relations] helpful,” and told them to respond as quickly
and accurately as possible. Instructions that place more
emphasis on speed and the importance of using the pro-
vided information might lead to greater intentional use
of correlations of lesser strength. In our case, it is possi-
ble that the subjects in the I75 condition of Experiment 3
actually became “risk averse” because of our instructions.
Processing Load and Explicit Rules
The subjective comments of subjects in the informed
condition clearly indicate that attempts to use explicit
rules involved effort. The data clearly show that effective
explicit rule usage requires time, as well. However, it
should also be noted that across all three experiments, in
15 of the possible 18 comparisons between equivalent
trial types, the informed subjects produced slower RTs
than did their uninformed counterparts.6 Thus the trend
toward slower overall responding for informed subjects
suggests that providing explicit information can create
an extra processing load, resulting in generally slower
performance (Green & Flowers, 1991). It thus might be
argued that there are circumstances in which, for optimal
performance, subjects are “better off not knowing.”
Implicit Learning of Event Correlations
The experiments presented here clearly suggest that
subjects’ performance is influenced by relatively modest
correlations between simultaneously presented flankers
and targets (Experiment 1) and by correlations between
targets and flankers that precede them by 750 msec (Ex-
periment 3). These influences seem to occur without ex-
plicit awareness of the contingencies or the intention to
act on them. However, these influences were absent when
correlated flankers and targets appeared in successive
trials (Experiment 2), even though that situation is con-
ducive to applying intentional predictive strategies for
correlation use. Unlike sequence learning tasks, in which
correlations between temporally separated events are
learned, the type of implicit perceptual learning in the
present flanker task may be limited to simultaneous or
temporally overlapping events. It is possible that the per-
ceptual learning involved in these flanker tasks reflects
a “low-level” perceptual mechanism similar to that pro-
posed by Treisman and her colleagues (Treisman & De-
schepper, 1994) to explain implicit learning of “unat-
tended” nonsense forms. Future research is required to
further define the boundary conditions for situations in
which implicit learning of perceptual correlations occur.
A systematic investigation of the influence of such factors
as temporal and spatial separation of correlated events, the
perceptual organization of events (e.g., Gestalt group-
ing), display clutter, and dual task processing load would
seem to be worthwhile. Such research might help answer
questions about the role of visual attention in such im-
plicit learning.
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NOTES
1. Uninformed subjects were given two additional questions follow-
ing those mentioned: (1) “Identify which of three flankers was more
likely to occur with a given target category.” (2) “Estimate the actual
percentage of times a letter or digit would be associated with a given
flanker.” However, inspection of these data indicated that subjects
found these questions difficult to interpret, so these data will not be de-
scribed.
2. The RTs were collapsed across blocks for presentation in the fig-
ures since there were no significant interactions involving block.
3. The block effects for each condition were as follows: U93 [F(2,38)
 4.05, MSe  2,287.47, p  .025]; I93 [F(2,38)  13.12, MSe 
1,068.29, p < .001]; U75 [F(2,38)  14.66, MSe  849.63, p < .001];
and I75 [F(2,38)  20.19, MSe  989.51, p < .001].
4. The questions were as follows: (1) “Did you notice any relation-
ship between letters and particular flankers? If yes, describe what you
noticed as completely as you are able.” (2) The next question was iden-
tical to the first but referred to digits rather than letters. (3) “Did you
notice whether a certain flanker was more likely to appear with a let-
ter than a digit? If yes, which one?” (4) The final question was a digit
version of the previous question.
5. This was an extremely conservative criterion for assessing verbal
knowledge of the existing associations. No subjects provided a com-
plete and accurate description of the stimulus structure. A typical
“more accurate” statement was, “It seemed that similar figures ap-
peared together like 9s and @ symbols.” Respondents giving this type
of response were assigned to the verbally consistent group if they wit-
nessed the stimulus structure in which @ and digits were associated.
Such verbal responses suggest that the majority of subjects in the ver-
bally consistent group did not discover the general flanker–target as-
sociations; rather, they recalled frequent or “memorable” instances
after being asked leading questions that encouraged them to “con-
struct” educated guesses about the existing stimulus structure.
6. One exception occurred in I93 for C trials in Experiment 3, where
subjects clearly took accuracy risks in order to hasten responses to pre-
dicted targets.
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